At the year's first equinox, the silken ground of balanced time is replete with golden dreams. The task is to think these dreams äs paths for philosophy and such thinking is a music.
The music of philosophy is not a static achievement but a possibility of answering song or reflective resonance: thinking. To do this we need less the promise of singing a new song (äs the achievement of thinking) than to learn to listen -for the possibility of harmony is the possibility of reticent or open attunement. This recollects the musical ideal of Greek antiquity where no one speaks who does not also at the same time listen and where the key to ethical virtue is not the imperative of law but measure or fittedness -attuned to the music of the heart, the music of life, but above all attuned to the singular possibility of attunement itself: the backstretched connexion [der gegensgehenden, gegenstrebigen Ge/uge, ] . Such an attunement attends to language, nature itself, or indeed the very venture of philosophy. For to say, äs Hölderlin does, "bald sind wir aber Gesang" is to propose that we may yet come to hear what is said in what is sung, äs the song of praise or wonder that is the sounding shock of wonder: the ringing silence or dazzled mien of philosophic thought broken open at its ineeption. The paradox is not the disappointment of a misappointment, if it is also that, but inneres in any insight into what is, any astonishment before being and in the face of the nature Heidegger spent a life trying to teach us not to go beyond. The poet sings praise and in this he holds attunement in the face of the glory of simple being in the prayer which is the only truth of praise.
It is music that invites one to think in response to what is said by hearing what is said both in the words and between the lines in the style of expression in poetry and in phüosophy äs what must bc learned, äs Nietzsche wrote, in parallel accord with Hölderlin. This music of thought is thc reason one still spcaks of thc very possibility of thc music of thc hcarr or; howcver bemusedly, of the echoing kncll of sounding or attuncd silcncc. This tuning is what Nietzsche meanc when hc spokc of phüosophixing with a hammer -not an inviration to a rcign of nihilism or self-asscrtive, fascist violence but an attunement in accord with Pythagoras's first musing on the diffcrential sounds rung out by hammer blows in the blacksmith's forge: the harmony of number and the world.
From Plato to Nietzsche to Heidegger, the musical idea of phüosophy is the ideal of the heights. The ethical praxis of music in phüosophy is that same genius that for Nietzsche comes to teach the heart to listen by teaching it the same reticence diät matters so much for Heidegger: teaching the impetuous heart that Plato despaired of hoiding, to stay, to dwell, to keep its peace. The music of the heart teaches the soul to hearken' to not only to itself but to the many voices on that perfect day of beauty on which, äs Hölderlin writes, nearly every art of song may be heard. It is the context in which, we have heard: soon, we too, shall be song:
,.~An einem schönen Tage läßt sich ja fast jede Sangart hören, und die Natur, wovon es her isf, nimmts auch wieder. Viel hat von Morgen an. Seit ein Gespräch mr sind und hören voneinander, Erfahren der Mensch; bald sind wir aber Gesang?
To speak of Hölderlin's song invites the silence Heidegger calls Besinnung. "Der Gesang ist die Feier der Ankunft der Götter -in welcher Ankunft alles still wird." 10 The advent of song heralds the feastday of the promised advent of gods once flown and only thus able to returri. Thus, beyond converse and hearing, the song to come calls for a transfiguration of philosophy, äs it requires a transfigured expression of language. This necessary transfiguration (and its failure) was the reason Heidegger's later philosophy could only shatter against the motif of style or language, for, äs he wrote, "Um dem Sprachwesen nachzudenken, ihm das Seine nachzutragen, braucht es einen Wandel der Sprache, den wir weder erzwingen noch erfinden können." 11 The shattering of language is a word for what may be named Nietzsche's style where the word is of necessity the poet's own word, which calls us to attend, or, äs Nietzsche teaches us: having learned, to listen.
Nietzsche and H lderlin
In 1864 (April/May), Nietzsche cites a crucial poem from H lderlin in his early ph ological notebooks, followed by two shorter verses from Goethe. 12 Entitkd "Nachtrag zu der Stelle 'ðáéÜí äå ëÜìðåé/", the entry explores a motif that would occupy Nietzsche's greater creative powers throughout his life, reflecting inveigled metaphors of light and sound, the one coloring the other and including a reference to the sounding wonder of Memnonss ttle at first light, 13 which Nietzsche later cites to such effect in his first bbok on tragedy: "der hellenische Dichter aber ber hrt wie ein Sonnenstrahl die erhabene und furchtbare Memnonss ule des Mythus, so dass er pl tzlich zu t nen beginnt"
14 Beyond the mythic manifestation of a sunbeam tuned to the resonant frequency of a lost Egyptian column of an unknown order, Nietzsche seeks to explore the metaphoric attunement of the senses: "Die Sinne des Sehens und des H rens sind unter einander in hnlicher Weise n her verwandt, wie etwa Geruch und Geschmack." Tracing this similarity to the common root of light and sound ("durch Schwingungen"), Nietzsche focuses upon the manifestatdons of this affinity in folk myth and poetry, illustrating the sensible resonance of light and sound, the metaphors for the one enhancing the other, and according to which coincidence, Nietzsche says, Apollo could be "ein Licht-und Sonnengott und zugleich der T ne Erfinder und Meister." Simikrly, the young Nietzsche continued, "ganz im griechischen Geiste dichtete H lderlin": In this way, the most significant gondola song, answering more than the calls along the distant corridors of Venetian canals, would be the song between Hölderlin and Nietzsche. Like Nietzsche's image of the voices echoing from proximities that may only resound from mountaintop to mountaintop, which Heidegger later appropriated to exemplify the nearness of greatness, Hölderlin's call resounds in Nietzsche's soul: Wo bist Du? ..., calling forth an answering song leaning on his bridge in Venice, in the bronzed, southern night of his own soul -ein Saitenspiel, äs he names it, -singing a gondola song in reply to the one heard -and in the remembered tone, poised above the night waters of Venice on the bridge of life itself (and in the pensive wake of a still present death, which had siknced, äs death quietiy does, the possibility of reconciliation, but not the possibility of framing the answer that can only be sung to a long \\licrc Hölderlin and Nictxschc and Heidegger invokc the Ideals of feast, celcbration, and joy in precise conncction with thinking or philosophy, how are wc to read Nietzsche's ultimate transfiguration of philosophy äs a festival of thought (or art) exactly between Hölderlin and Heidegger? I scck to explore this complex constclladon äs the dynamic play of affinity and influence regarding the manner in which Nietzsche's own writJng (that is, particularly his provocatively "poetic" style) may be secn to have transforrned not only the literary possibilities but also the crirical basis of philosophy and therewith, again, and only perhaps, die potential of what may bc thought äs philosophy.
Influence and Interpretation
Hölderlin's mark on Nietzsche is both brighter and more complex than Cosima Wagner's alarmed report. 29 Writing, äs we Have just seen, his most beautiful poem in Hölderlin's own tone -after copying it down in his notes, quite possibly from heart, many years earlier -Nietzsche also patterns his greatest work on Hölderlin's fragments for the tragic drama Der Tod des Empedokles.
7 ® But Nietzsche also seems to disappoint this same influence for he seems unable to resist mocking the name and much more, 31 äs Nietzsche similarly compromises himself -the way he compromises everyone, the way Heidegger notoriously overreads the history of philosophy. And yet, part of Nietzsche's protean style is that he is thereby also able to give the lie to his own posturing bravado (and, 29 Cosima's notes betray an obvious anxiety of influence upon the (i. e., concerning the right influences on the impressionable) energies and thoughts of a tarne or pet philosophy ptofessor. 30 or äs such: to undcrstand I lölcleriin (Nietzsche), to bc able to talk about Hölder-lin'* (or Nictzschc's ovvn) work, onc necds to have read it, all of it.
Thus Nietzsche idenrificd a literal, cxact barbarism in the spirk and substance of negative judgmcnts concerning Hölderlin, in order to raisc the same genealogically formal objcction to Friedrich Vischer's condescendirig account of Hölderlin. Against Vischer's condcsccnsion -clucking of Hölderlin "es fehlte ihm als Waffe der Humor"
35 -Nietzsche deploys a challenge requiring considerable nuance beyond the reduction of Nietzsche to the laughing philosophcr 36 (a judgment that goes far to capture Nietzsche's appeal to so many and so many different readers: he teäches us to laugh, commentators teil us, he brings "a sense of humor to philosophy") 37 -for philistinism entails the same sense of humor Vischer advocates and exemplifies the tactic of mockery which some readers of Nietzsche prefer. Mocking provocation is the very definition of the philistine, diät is -so Nietzsche in turn polemicizes beyond Vischer and his peers -the cultttred barbarian captures the/e'ssence of philistinism itself. And Nietzsche shared this sombre insight vvith Hölderlin. This cultural philistinism is what Germans are, this distant fantasy was Greece, here is what was and here is what is, and -far more than historical methods and more critical than historical accuracies -what can be lies shattered in the shadowy hiatus of thick and unthinking barbarism in the between that endures beyond the mere Separation of time.
Celebrated today not merely äs one of but äs perhaps the most profound of poets, of unquestioned rank, Hölderlin was not always so regarded: not during his lifetime, be it before or after his flight from the discourse of the public realm, and not thereafter. For more than half a Century, where there is any judgment at all, the Standard scholarly judgment of Hölderlin's poetry con-35 Ibid., p. 164. 36 Nietzsche's Strategie critique here is usually ascribed to his youth. Later, commentators are quick to claim Nictzsche's own voice on the side of a necessary sense of humor äs a prelude to his ultimate provocative and insouciant image äs the "laughing philosopher," But Nietzsche promised less to teach us to laugh (this isn't even Archilochus's promise) than he proposed to his readers the very different challenge of learning to laugh at oneself ^ "wie man lachen müsste," äs one would have to laugh, "um aus der ganzen Wahrheit heraus zu lachen" (FW, Erstes Buch l, KSA 3, p. 370). Nietzsche's laughter is no less serious than his reflections on play, that is on music and tragedy. See, a bit later in Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Nietzsche's counterintuitive musing on the "Reife des Mannes: das heisst den Ernst wiedergefunden haben, den mäh *als Kind hatte, beim Spiel" (JGB 94). Here the emphasis is less on playfulness, or the adult fantasy of the lightness lost in childhood than the extraordinarily earnest quality of childhood and its unremitting lack of irony. 37 See: Kunas, Tarmo: Nietzsches Lachen. Ein Studie über das Komische in Nietzsches Werken.
München 1982, äs well äs a series of earnest enthusiasts for the Nietzschean sense of humor, the names of whom can be generated alrnost at random. demned it äs obscure -very much in the same way and for the same reason that Heidegger's philosophy is popularly condemned. Hölderlin's interest in antiquity (together with his pantheism) was rejected äs less than properly or decendy "German." Norbert von Hellingrath's Promethean venture removed Hölderlin's oeuvre from the guarded reserves and the critical esteerW of his more conservative editors (and scholars from Vischer onward), setting a new aspect of the poet before a new generation of war-sobre eyes and revitalized judgment. 38 But when Nietzsche wrote, the apotheosis of Hölderlin (crowned in die blood of two wars), was iinimagined at a time when hardly any one but die most esoteric scholar, German or otherwise, knew Hölderlin's name. 39 Like scholarly judgments on Nietzsche himself, the greater part of comparative judgment on Hölderlin remained qualifiedly slighting, nor did this judgment simply vanish with von Hellingrath's publication of the late work of so-called madness, though, and to be sure it began to change with the George circle (if this change swung toward the Charybdis of all-too-excessively German Nazi alliance), or, to name die philosophers, Dilthey (who called Hölderlin a visionary or "Sehef*) or Jaspers (äs the philosophical and scientifico-medical counterpart to Stefan Zweig, exemplifying the lasdng influence of psychoanalytic judgment, today derived, at one fashionable extreme, by Jean Laplanche from Jacques Lacan, and originally articulated in terms taken from Freud and Jung, for Zweig and Jaspers The historical association with Nazism is wrongrrrindedly persistent (it is claimcd, in a damnable inaccuracy, that Hölderlin's hymn Germanien rcquired deliberatc elision in order to be useful in a time of war). 42 Hence, given Heidegger's political history, Heidegger's apostrophising of Hölderlin's essence and rank, "Dichter der Deutschen," 43 continues to be read äs if Heidegger were cxpressing nothing but a party or Nazi enthusiasm for the poet. 4 * But beyond the political convenience which encourages such contentions, after Nietzsche, 45 Heidegger was one of the first scholars to regard Hölderlin äs poet without coordinately aligning bis poetry (be it äs pathology or divine mark) with madness. th centuries, offers the important reminder that in his day, Nietzsche was "only a marginal figure" and hence the reception of Nietzschc's "comments on Hölderlin would only gain importance after Nietzsche's death" -that is, only after a similarly blocked set of obsctacles to understanding Nietzsche himself had been, äs thcy are still not entirely, weathered down. Lernout, Geerd: The Poet äs Thinker. Hölderlin in France. South Carolina 1994, p. 4. Lernout cites Allessandro Pellegrini's ciaim that the key to Nietzsche*s reception of Hölderlin lies in his broader cultural program the ideal of a return to Greece, betraying what has been called the nostalgia of Germany for Greece (Taminiaux, see reference below) or the tyranny of Greece over Germany. For Pellegrini, "Hölderlins Werk wurde besser verstanden, nachdem es durch Nietzsche erläutert worden war." (Friedrich Hölderlin, op. cit, p. 39) This is the claim Bothe opposes and Lernout qualifies but it is perhaps better, to suggest a reading of Nietzsche"s reception of Hölderlin not äs an introduction to or defense of the poet, dcspite Nietzsche's youthful efforts, but äs l have begun to do here, with regard to the Singular resonance of Hölderlin's influence in Nietzsche's work. 46 Hans-Georg Gadamer Claims Heidegger's reading äs decisive: indeed, literally so, for Heidegger "forces us to decide." Gadamer, Hans For this reason, Eckart Förster both accurately and usefully prefaces the English edition of Dieter Henrich's reactive (contra-Heidegger) study of Hölder-lin's Andenken^ with a leading reference to the importance of Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin -thereby inadvertedly contradicting Henrich's de-constructive strike against Heidegger's earlier and famous reading of that poem. For it is more than parenthetically significant that Henrich himself fails to mention Heidegger by name -just äs he fails to cite any but only small excerpts from Hölderlin's poem in his reading of it, thereby effectively excluding Hölderlin just äs neatly äs he leaves Heidegger out of his text. For his part, and like Gadamer, Förster relates Heidegger's priority in Hölderlin's scholarly reception for the benefit of an English language audience. Citing Nietzsche äs the "philosopher who set the stage for the Hölderlin renaissance in our Century,"
48 Förster confirms the importance for Heidegger of von Hellingrath's edition äs "an earthquake," 49 in Heidegger's words (these are the same words Stefan Zweig employs, recalling not only Nietzsche's own description of Hölderlin's Hyperion äs a turbulent wave crashing over him, 50 but Hölderlin's own account of the self-transformation effected by his sojourn in Bordeaux, "und wie man Helden nachspricht, kann ich wohl sagen, daß mich Apollo geschlagen"). 51 Thus Förster situates the critical and "perhaps unique" importance of Heidegger's reception of Hölderlin. Beginning with his 1934-35 lecture courses (held direcdy in the wake of Heidegger's failed debut äs Nazi rector), Förster writes that Heidegger "entered into a dialogue with the poet that continued throughout his life," whereby "Hölderlin represents the alternative to the entire metaphysical tradirion that reaches its peak in HegePs System."
52 In specific and contrasting focus, Henrich's interpreüVe project opposes Heidegger's reading, both äs an account of his poetry and äs philosophy, reclaiming Hölderlin, at least in theory, and qua theorist, to be installed within the frame of idealist philosophy, vis-a-vis Kant, Hegel (and Schelling), and Fichte (Schiller and Goethe, äs well äs Reinhold). In this way, Henrich proposes that we understand Hölderlin from the perspective the fifdes and sixties in VCest Germany cannot be exaggerated." Lernout The Poet äs Thinker, op. cit., p. 13. of idcalist philosophy, hearing his poetry ander thc same constraints* h is hardly any wondcr that Henrich refuses the poct a voice in his imerpretive tcxt whcre thc poet's own \vords might havc opposed the cogency and the appeal of such a reductivc (and it is a reductive) claim.
Ijtngttage and Thougbt Behveen Hölderlin and Nietzsche
Hölderlin's own tragic reflcction is the most significant source of Nietzsche's rethinking of the nature of tragedy äs it is brought to word in Nietzsche's fatal, philological debut, Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Ceiste der Musik. Because the music at the origin of tragedy, äs Nietzsche writes, is "nur aus ihren Niederschlag als Lyrik uns Bekannt,'* the keys to tragedy in Nietzsche's reading are the studies in rhythm Nietzsche plans but never brings to professional publication in the context of his studies of language, together with the figure of the philosopher Empedocles (whom Nietzsche yokes with tragedy) again and exactly via Hölder-lin:
Für die stete Wiederholung -U-U usw. den Rhythmus der Reim-Dichtung sind wir musikalisch zu anspruchsvoll (vom mißverstandenenen Hexameter noch abgesehen!) Wie wohl thut uns schon die Form Platens und Hölderlins! Aber viel zu streng für uns! Das Spiel mit den verschiedensten Metren und zeitweilig das Unmetrische ist das Rechte: die Freiheit, die wir bereits in der Musik, durch R<ichard> W<agner>, erlangt haben! dürfen wir uns wohl für die Poesie nehmen! Zuletzt: es ist die einzige, die stark zu Herzen redet! -Dank Luther! (KSA 11, 25[172]) That Nietzsche is able at the same time to hear the same key in Wagner's music proves the metonymy of thinking itself. And this metonymy reminds us that the resonance of thinking always entails thinking more than one thing by and with a single word.
In the same associative fashion, Heidegger found himself compelled to turn both to Nietzsche and Hölderlin for the sake of his post-rectorial articulation of what he called his own Beiträge %ur Philosophie. The constellation is significant both for understanding the limits of Heidegger's negative reading of Nietzsche and the depths of Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin in terms of the key proximity between thinking and poetry but also in terms of Heidegger's later and maligned silence. This constellation likewise provides the key to Heidegger's contention that it would be no one but Nietzsche who would destroy hirn in the end 53 -not his own (badly misjudged) Nazi enthusiasms nor the Nazi politics on a banal and real level that had stripped him of power and influence äs swiftiy and briefly, passingly, äs they had, one month for every year of die Reich, once elevated him to power.
Where Heidegger acknowledges Hölderlin äs "Dichter des Dichters" he grants Nietzsche nothing like a parallel accolade.
54 This is not only because Heidegger means to requisition the title of thinker par exceilence for himself. For it is routinely claimed that Nietzsche is only, i. e., that Nietzsche is no more than, or just, a poet. This clairn offers not only a negative judgment of Nietzsche's quality äs (his identity or being) a philosopher in a convicted (dominant and ruling) climate of analytic (theoretical, logical-and science-minded) philosophy. From the beginning, Nietzsche himself (qna Zarathustra) originates the judgment in his own case (such a critical dependency on the author himself for the terms of Interpretation -however bastard -may be confirmed äs the dominant conventionality or trope of Nietzsche reception throughout the past Century). Taking on himself the same sobriquet (only a poet) -subsequently employed äs a lever and a wedge to separate Nietzsche's works from "real" or professional, self-serious philosophy -Nietzsche himself is the first source of his own "outsider's" Status. Thus Nietzsche, at times, may be named a poet to denigrate his work, just äs the same term, at other times, may be invoked to elevate his works "abo\-e" philosophy with the result that Nietzsche is not (Nietzsche is still not) typically read first and foremost äs a philosopher, which in turn inevitably leads to the correlevant effect that Nietzsche's writings, äs "poetry," have also been and still remain exposed (äs philosopher's writings are rarely regarded äs fully liable to, äs fully needing) the labours and analyses of literary scholars.
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As Zarathustra, Nietzsche teases himself äs only fool, only poet. Thus Nietzsche speaks äs one positioning himself in proximity to the greats of history, taking himself äs related to the rare. But to say this is to recall that Nietzsche names himselfj qua Zarathustra, "nur Narr, nur Dichter" in his most elevated, in his most abandoned or loneliest moment. In this loneliness, Nietzsche held discoursc, spoke most deeply to himself, äs hc had earlier, bcforc Zarathustra, rhyrned to himsclf in a ticktock charm: "Ja, mein Herr," becoming, through this samc discoursc with himsclf, his own best friend, "Sie sind ein Dichter/ 7 Best frtcnds know how to teil the truth, it i$ said, and this may be so cven when that best and only friend is onc's soul.
Patendy, and this itsclf is fuel for an industry that revives the romantic vision of the genius, this same ideal of fool and poet in Nietzsche's words cxpresses the vision of the solitary (and with this: the madtnan), so that, of course, Hölder-lin too would have and would keep this loneliness to the extreme condemnation of some forty years of it; for his part, Heidegger would win it by turns and turns until he learnt to keep true to the silence he told himself äs related only to the rare, i. e., with Nietzsche and with Hölderlin, related only to the Greeks. This story of poetry and solitude is also the story of nature, it is the story of tragedy and it is the story of poiitics read, in order to be tragedy, in terms of love. It is Heraclitus and Sophocles, Pindar ano^Empedocles, Socrates and Alcibiades (that is, in Nietzsche's language, we may count Socrates in this register if \ve regard Socrates mythically, in terms of his own mythic projection, äs Nietzsche named him the greatest of erotics).
Germany and Greece: The Ground ofEwpedocks and tbe Tragic Ideal
Nietzsche Stands between both Hölderlin and his archaicizing relation to the forgotten deities of Greece and Heidegger's assertion of the esseritial relation between Germany and Greece. For Heidegger, this complex question is adumbrated via the special affinity Heidegger declares between Germany and Greece, an affinity Heidegger finds, äs he ultimately finds everything, in language. External perspectives variously name this affine relation the "tyranny" of Greece over Germany (äs in E. M. Buder's still indispensable book on the subject) or "nostalgia" of Germany for Greece (to use Jacques Taminiaux's own carefully philosophical reprise of the classicism of German idealism and thought at the turn of the Century that irrevocably links the fortunes of the nineteenth to the eigtheenth cenruries). 56 Recently, the wake of the Parias scandal exposed another dimension of this affinity between Germany and Greece, equal parts vulnerability and reactively nationalist sensibility on the part of recent French (especiaüy literary, to wit: Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, etc.) readings and 56 Taminiaux, Jacques: Le nostalgie de la Grece a l'aube de Tidealisme alle m and. The Hague 1967.
See also Taminiaux's recent Le tbeatre des pbilosopbes (Grenoble 1995) , where he discusses in three successive chapters, Nietzsche (in the context of Die Geburt der Tragödie) t . Heidegger, Sophocles, and the pre-Socratic philosophers, and, finally, the shadings of Aristode in Hölderlin.
English and American Interpreters. This contrast betrays the pritnacy of Interpretation over philosophy but above all it is meant contra Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin (and Nietzsche). This is the inherent didacticism of recent debates on the national or the proper (what is ownmost to the Germans -or to the French, the English, the Americans, and, not incidentally, the Asian: brought out of occidental marginalization only to be obliterated again in a collective national assignment). 57 Above all, such debates are meant to remind the reader diät Heidegger's focus on the specifically, identifiably, regionally German in Hölderlin's poetry is a massively unhappy emphasis, an historically fatal mistake. Thus äs can be seen in Peter Szondi, Andrzej Warjminski, etc., the ethical topos of the oriental (the utterly Other, äs the terminus conveys an imaginary image of alterity indebted to Levinas rather than -it is to be regretted, for there are affinities here if only we could begin to find them -to Hölderlin) is posed äs the true nature of antique Greece, whereby the Greeks come to be rendered more African (Egyptian or Asian), than Aryan (geschweige DeutscK). The associative play governing all such national namings and alliances need not (cannot) interest us here, nor indeed the question of whether it is or could be correct to trace the origins of Greece to the Orient (or substitutable Egyptian/African) but instead to note that the key to such a reading seeks to establish not merely that the Greeks are "foreign \fhmdf 9 to us, äs Hölderlin already wrote, but utterly and (polemically presented äs Hölderlin's insight into the orientalism of Greek antiquity) precisely "other. A related concern with racism is adumbrated with reference, of all things, to the "brown" women of the Garonne -one imagincs a similar darkness should be ascribed to Nietzsche's own "kleines süsses Weib von Niedertracht und Anmuth" (EH, Warum ich so klug bin 7, KSA 6, p. 290) evoked precisely in the context of the poem that we have traced to Hölderlin and äs the kind of woman who reminds him of the music of the south, and the name of Vcnice.
Articulating thc rcJation betwecn thinkers such äs Nietzsche and Heidegger, wc can take Hölderlin to mcnn that the disposition over one's own is unfree and hence we arc to tutn to what is foreign. But according to Nietzsche, and preciscly for thc Gcrmans thcmsclves in thcir aspiration for the "best" that has ever bcen, for things imagined Greek, "sind alle Brücken abgebrochen" (KSA 11, 41f4)) and die lack of national innocence must be underlined, for the same shattered prospect holds for the French, äs for the Bnglish, certainly for Americans, for Slavs, for Africans, for all peoples in the new fiercely nationalistic world-order.
Thc communicative key might lie in the almost that must be counted in the place of so much in life. It is only afterwards that the poet is able to begin to say to us, stunned äs we are, that Schmerzlos sind wir und haben fast/Die Sprache in der Fremde verloren (Nlnemosyne^ 2. Fassung) -and only afterwards that we can begin to return to or read a sense back into Hölderlin's imperative claim "Deßwegen sind die Griechen des Heiligen Pathos wenige/Meister, weil es ihnen angeboren war." In place of die holy pathos, instead of their own very Greek, very oriental fire, they dispose wagisterially over "Junonische Nüchternheit" exacdy in the measure to which they made i t their own. 59 To recognize the only possible transit in what Nietzsche called "die Regenbogen der Begriffe" (KSA 11, 41 [4] ) between foreign lands of thought, 60 one must recognise not the passion for thinking he teasingly mocks äs the will to "Geisterhaftigkeit" -naming scholars "gräcisi-rende Gespenster" -but rather one must anticipate the place of bodily bearing or the corporeal necessity that holds the key to divine happiness: one must come to oneself, not äs a homecoming but a re-cognition of the foreign that inheres in one's own heart and history.
Nietzsche begins one of his most important Prefaces with the claim that we are strangers to ourselves, to conclude with the exigence of learning to read (äs he elsewhere reminds us of the necessity to learn how to think and to learn how to love) 61 and Hölderlin explains "Aber das Eigene muß so gut gelernt seyn, wie das Fremde. Deßwegen sind uns die Griechen unentbehrlich. Nur \verden wir gerade in unserm Eigenen, Nationellen nicht nachkommen, weil ... astfreie Gebrauch des Eigenen das schwerste ist." 62 Nietzsche's effort to approximate the problem of "der freie Gebrauch des Eigenen" lies in his work, patently traced through the lines of the self-reflected lineage of an author's self- rcccnt tactic of rc-rcading thc postmodcrn conccption of (i-cvinasian/Derritlnciin) diffcrencc or altcrity agninst Heideggcr's conccrn for the forc k ign and thc distant cannot bc cxpcctcd to work against thc onc whosc most enduring achievcmcnt was to teach a generation of scholars that "man kann vielleicht das Denken lernen" -in Arendt's very solcmnlyjunonian encomium. That Heidegger was a tendier would fit him, in his own languagc, into the place of those who are just what they arc, äs Nietzsche claimed and äs Hölderlin was only a poet: "Dichter nur, aber dann wirklich Dichter," 66 just äs one may speak of "pricsts only" and "rulers only," -but dien actual, or real [wirklich] priests and rulers, äs Heidegger characterizes this exigence sometimes called authenticity in his rcading of the first stasimon of Sophocles' Antigone in Einführung In die A'Ietaplysik. Heidegger's exacdy magisterial -äs Lehrer not Führer -rule was witnessed not only by Arendt but Gadamer and Löwith (one of those who would move from Student to antagonist during and after the war). In Arendt's expression, "Das Gerücht sagt es ganz einfach: Das Denken ist wieder lebendig geworden, die totgeglaubten Büdungsschätze der Vergangenheit werden zum Sprechen gebracht, wobei sich herausstellt, das sie ganz andere Dinge vorbringen, als man mißtrauisch vermutet hat" 67 But this means that Heidegger's language-referred effort to trace the relationship between Germany and Greece has more in common with Nietzsche's tragic sensibility contra the Standard review of the receprion of antiquity than has previously been conceded -given the antagonism scholars continue to install between Heidegger and Nietzsche, äs an ostracising chasm eliminatdng the one philosopher who engages Nietzsche for philosophy (and not merely for and äs an exegesis of his thought). For Heidegger, for Nietzsche, and for Hölderlin, the Greek is not imagined proximately German (the banality of saying the same) so much äs utterly distant from the German. Hence, and much radier, the modern is charged to come to win itself by an effort to approach the foreign, to track, and so to measure antiquity with the sense of a prior eclipse or disappointment in (KSA 7, 5 [94] ). Such a comparison can seem tendentious because Nietzsche's description of the "moralische" comprehension of Empedocles' "Thier und Pflanzenwelt" is typicaliy expressed in terms of a simply Schopenhauerian impulse: " "Wille" universal," referring back to Empedocles' expression of "der universale Geschlechtstrieb und Haß" (KSA 7, 19[134] ). Paralleling Heraclitus with Empedocles, Nietzsche also highlights Heraclitus's basic misanthropy, in good philological exactitude, in careful contrast to Empedokles'/ Zarathustra's populär devotion to his people, towards the end of -or in a Hölderlinian modality -for the sake of a higher reconcilation with the world of nature and in a still greater context, with time or the divine. 72 But, Nietzsche's circumspect context must be considered with reference to this same coordination between Empedocles, the most esoteric of the presocratic philosophers, and hence the least comprehended and comprehensible, and the figure of Heraclitus himself, which association the young Nietzsche effects with reference to no one but Anaximander. 73 Hcraclitus, Empcdoclcs, Anaximander arc prescnted äs ruler-sages. Listing "Empcdoclcs Liebe und Haß in Griechenland" with "Heraciit. Cosmodicee der Kunst" and adding, "Democrit und Pythagoreer. Naturwissenschaft und Metaphysik" (KSA 7, 21 [l 5]), Nietzsche regards both Heraclitus and Empedocles not mercly äs lawgivers but exactly äs artists of the mystical, mythical (and, Nietzsche affirms, in Empedocles' casc: of the magical). Nietzsche associatcs Heraclitus and Empedocles within his own apostrophic but philologically dictated history of ancient thinkers. 75 In his notes or studies, from early to late, Nietzsche rarely singles any one name out of context (and this is a significant difference again to the published declarations where he, like Hegel, frequently proclaims his affinity with Heraclitus above all).
76 Nietzsche traces the names of antiquity äs they are given,to us, in citation and report, in terms of influence, a dedication which took every bit of Nietzsche's philological formation and which he pursued not to abandon philology for philosophy, äs some authors imagine, but exactly in order to raise critical questions in that same tradition. Nietzsche articulates such parallels within the scheine of art without claiming a literaliy historical affinity. Paired in this fashion to Empedocles, Heraclitus can be matched with the "uranfanglichfe]" definition of "die bildende Kraft des Künstlers" (KSA 7, 19[134] ). In this association, Nietzsche's philological practice, just äs his critics have charged since Ukich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, seems äs litde ried to historical references äs the many other historical and thencontemporary nominal references characterising the style and substance of his discourse -a point which illustrates less his imprecision than it should be read äs an object demonstration of the critical insight of his philology in the very context of scholarship äs such. Any other practice would illustrate what Nietzsche named a lack of philology QGB 47; cf. AC 52; KSA 13, 15[82] ): thus Nietzsche's energetic and apparent imprecision contests the scholastic convictions proper to philology äs much äs to philosophy, withal, contra the ideal of science in general. This critical contention against the convicted security of received knowledge, challenging die supposed facts of the same, is the essence of Nietzsche's critical epistemology -the same epistemology that Nietzsche scholarship, be it German or American or French (not to mention mainstream philosophy), continues to ignore by regarding Nietzsche äs no more than a moral or even a political philosopher. 77 For, in context, in his own reading of antiquity and its unique art of tragedy, Nietzsche employs the names of Empedocles and Heraclitus for their insight into nature itself, opposing reigning convention ("Dieser Schein der 'griechischen Heiterkeit"' in Sokrates und die griechische Tragoedie} and to put the point on his own counterreflection: als ob es nie ein sechstes Jahrhundert mit seiner Geburt der Tragoedie, seinen Mysterien, seinen Empedocles und Heraclit gegeben habe, ja als ob die Kunstwerke der grossen Zeit gar nicht vorhanden seien, die doch -jedes für sich -aus dem Boden einer solchen greisenhaften und sklavenmässigen Daseinslust und Heiterkeit gar nicht zu erklären sind und auf eine völlig andere Weltbetrachtung als ihren Existenzgrund hinweisen. (KSA l, p. 606) Nietzsche's artistic account of the nature of understanding (i. e., the Nietzschean illusion of knowledge) thus exemplifies his very apostrophic and specifically antagonistic or polemical history of philosophy, e. g.: "von Thaies bis Sokrates -lauter Übertragungen des Menschen auf die Natur -ungeheure Schattenspiele des Menschen auf der Natur, wie auf Gebirgen!" (KSA 7, 19[134] 79 Claims the sacrificial moment beyond this life enacted by "Empedokles" äs a spirituai answer and offers the key to Nietzsche's reflections not only on the ideal of a timely death but also concerning the stylistic question of endings. Ldkewise, Nietzsche describes the tragic countenance and comportment of Anaximander äs Empedokles' own exemplar: "Er lebte, wie er schrieb; er sprach so feierlich als er sich kleidete, er erhob die Hand und setzte den Fuß, als ob dieses Dasein eine Tragödie sei, in der er, als Held, mitzuspielen geboren sei. In alle dem war er das große Vorbild des Empedokles" (PHG 4, KSA l, p. 820 f.) -a description of Zarathustra's Empedoclean mien and manner that similarly embraces Zarathustra in the idealized light of his own inventor: <c Empedocles ist der reine tragische Mensch. Sein Sprung in den Aetna aus -Wissenstrieb! Er sehnte sich nach Kunst und fand nur das Wissen. Das Wissen aber macht Fausten." (KSA 7, 5[94] ) Later, Nietzsche adds to this tragic projection of the transformation of art äs he conceives it throughout his philosophy and in his own Zarathustra project beyond the limits of the symbolic and sacrificial death of Empedokles. In addition to the project of the ascetic ideal in science "Das Wissen ohne Maß und Grenze," in a manner reminiscent of his later incantation of the life-affirming urgency of art äs a shield in the fäce of the deadly efficacy of truth, Nietzsche observes: "Dieser Trieb muß sogar die Kunst erzeugen, als die Heilerin." (KSA 7, 7[101] ) A similarly aesthetic reference is evident in Nietzsche's own careful association of Empedocles äs rhetorician and the Speeches and the task ascribed to Zarathustra. 
The Nature ofthe Tragic äs Suffering in Nietzsche and Hölderlinian Joy
Expressed äs the tragic work of art, Nietzsche understands the archaic nature of tragedy not only äs a poetic or musical conception but recollected on the terms of suffering: "Die Welt vom Leiden aus zu verstehen ist das Tragische in der Tragödie" (KSA 8, 6[20j) . Nietzsche's response is the avocation of love. Calling something good, in blessing and gratitude for its being äs such, is the truth of tragedy and this truth becomes the love of life Nietzsche names amor fati> affirmation. Nietzsche's Zarathustra thus recalls Hölderlin's highest tonalities, äs they are expressed in the extraordinary final words of the novel Hyperion: "Lebendige Töne sind wir, stimmen zusammen in deinem Wohllaut, Natur! wer reißt denn? Wer mag die Liebenden scheiden?"
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Recollecting the resonance of this same conflicted reconciliation, the quarrel between Zarathustra and life in Das andere Tanzlied is posed in shining tones recalling Hölderlin's influence on Nietzsche äs we have heard its echoes from die beginning, now expressed äs what one reader has named Nietzsche's barcarole, in a Pindarian echo that is Nietzsche's own: "In dein Auge schaute ich jüngst, oh Leben: Gold sah ich in deinem Nacht-Auge blinken, -mein Herz stand still vor dieser Wollust: -einen goldenen Kahn sah ich blinken auf nächtigen Gewässern, einen sinkenden, trinkenden, wieder winkenden goldenen Schaukel-Kahn! (Za , Das andere Tanzlied l, KSA 4, p. 282)
In the back and forth cyde of attraction and repulsion to follow, Nietzsche, promising the eternal äs the shuddering resonance, or Standing wave of the seifsame, echoes the Heraclitean, Empedoclean mode heard in the conflicts of lovers and the reconciliation of all change ki the height of nature, once again, at the end of Hölderlin's Hyperion: "Wie der Zwist der Liebenden, sind die Dissonanzen der Welt Versöhnung ist mitten im Streit und alles Getrennte findet sich wieder."
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Tragic suffering speaks the essence of joy not, äs Hölderlin reminds us with sustained amazement, "das freudigste freudig zu sagen/' 83 Yet to discover joy spoken by sorrow is not to suppose that there is "no" suffering -or that suffering is an Illusion. Hölderlin's sensitivity to pain exacdy in (not even in) joy gleams in every word that speaks of mild air, soft breezes, the tension between abundance and loss: What is manifest in Hölderlin's puce tension, in bis reflcx of life, is transfigured into a sustained emphasis on pain in Nietzsche's tragic reflections on life and the ultimate ideal of affirmation that is the core of Nietzsche's thinking on will to power äs the eternal return of the same äs atnorfatLT hus it is possible to hear a (necessarily) transfiguring ambiguity in Nietzsche's cheapest, harshest claims exactly addressed to the nature of pain and empathy. As offensively äs he emphasises "Eine schmerzhafte Nacht eines einzigen hysterischen Bildungs-Weibchens" (Glyi II 7, KSA 5, p. 303), Nietzsche also compares the suffering of savages and the sufferings of animals in the vivisection and the thoughdess cruelty äs practiced to this day in university and industrial research contexts, exactly beyond the fearsome constellation of such a Community of suffering. For this reason, the deliberately provocative point of his collocatdon of comparisons (opposing scientific perspecrives on such rhings äs continue to plague philosophical reflection äs pain itself) is easily overlooked in our politdcaUy enlightened horror or "better-knowing" contemplation and correlevant urge to overspring its content:
Vielleicht that damals -den Zärtlingen zum Trost gesagt -der Schmerz noch nicht so weh wie heute; wenigstens wird ein Arzt so schliessen dürfen, der Neger (diese als Repräsentanten des vorgeschichtlichen Menschen genommen -) bei schweren inneren Entzündungs fallen behandelt hat, welche auch den bestorganisirten Europäer fast zur Verzweiflung bringen; -bei Negern thun sie dies nicht. (Die Curve der menschlichen Schmerzfähigkeit scheint in der That ausserordentlich und fast plötzlich zu sinken, sobald man erst die oberen Zehn-Tausend oder Zehn-Millionen der Über-cultur hinter sich hat; und ich für meine Person zweifle nicht, dass, gegen Eine schmerzhafte Nacht eines einzigen hysterischen Bildungs-Weibchens gehalten, die Leiden aller Thiere insgesammt, welche bis jetzt zum Zweck wissenschaftlicher Antworten mit dem Messer befragt worden sind, einfach nicht in Betracht kommen.) (GM II 7, KSA 5, p. 303) Beyond the polemical (i. e., contra the patently scientistic judgment of nineteenth-century medical science), the point of Nietzsche's detailed description of pain highlights the elusiveness of sensibility, the impossibility of sentiment. We do not and can never feel another's pain. Indeed, we can feel it so little that we never imagine or concede extraordinary respect for another's pain -which awe or respect might be the appropriate complement to ignorance, but much, much radier, in a move Nietzsche analyses in a number of similar cases and exacdy where the moral rule does command the highest respect for the other, we diminish the odier's pain in any estimation we might form of it in our own minds:
we imagine that what we feel, the other feels likewise. For this reason and with a perfecdy good conscience, we degrade the "perceived" or presumed pain of another to greater or lesser degrees of insubstantiality. Where we feel nothing, (it seemsi) nothing exists: 'Wofür wir keine Sinne haben, <das> existirt für uns nicht" (KSA 9, 11[75] ). 87 Thus -and not only in general -one determines that certain human beings simply feel less pain, just äs animals are, per definitiomm^ said to "feel" nothing scientists call pain but rather "stimuli responses," just äs medical tlieorists once proposed similarly to reduce the differences between social and cultural differences in the expression of pain and in perception in general between the races, Black, White, Asian, and which races once also included the fantasy of difference between the "Aryan" and the Jew.
Owing to Nietzsche's very Greek sensibility, developed in response to Pindar and Sophodes and äs evidenced by his affinity for Hölderlin, the problem of tragedy (blindness, stupidity, cursedness, injustice, extra-human pain and ordinary sorrow) äs music, äs art, äs life was to remain Nietzsche's problem äs a problem. This is his key question which he develops from his book on tragedy to his last reflection on idols, Wagner, and the Antichrist Nietzsche's insight into the essence of tragedy holds the heart of cruelty äs the draught of tragedy, which he reprises äs the meaning of tragic wisdom or amorfati thought together with the insight into life itself: "alles Werden und Wachsen, alles ZukunftVerbürgende bedingt den Schmerz ..." (GD, Was ich den Alten verdanke 4, KSA 6, p. 159) -äs the very deliberate affirmation of subjective pain in every process and needful in every innocence. As Karl Reinhardt's uncompromising clarification of the still misleading characterisation of Nietzsche äs "Lebensphilosoph" reminds us: "Allerdings, was Nietzsche "Leben" nennt, ist ein sehr unbequemer, fordernder Begriff des Lebens." 88 Nietzsche's unsparing focus on pain diverges from Hölderlin's arch Empedoclean, consummately transfigured relation between love (Liebe) and suffering (leidetj y La/d) and differs further from Heidegger's less passionate aspiration in the turns of what the first finds äs the frei4digste and the latter names Gelassenheit ** Ct Nietzsche's clarißcation: "Feiner zugesehn, heißt solches "das ist falsch" eigentlich nur "ich fühle daxin nichts von mir", "ich mache mir nichts daraus" "ich begreife nicht, wie ihr nicht mit mir fühlen könnt" (KSA 12, 2[35]) ** Reinhardt: Vermächtnis der Antike, op. cit, p. 345. says, his happiness in othcr, wilder colors -cchocd in other tonaüties (cf. JGB 296), but still recaJiing rhc samc play bctwcen color and tone we first saw in his Student writings on the lambent song.
If wc can suffer a penultimate cxcursus on art for the sake of this quotation of color and tone, it may be possiblc to contemplatc the diffcrence betwcen the spaces of visual images in painting and the arts of sculpture and architecture, äs the difference between dream and music, Apollo and Dionysus.
Apollo, äs Nietzsche names him, "der "Scheinende",*' is also "des Bildnergottes" (GT l, KSA l, p. 27 f.). But the "sunlike" eye of Apollo corresponds to an image of "jene maassvolle Begrenzung" -not the dissonant or reconciled attunement of music or tragedy or the working space of sculpture itself. When Nietzsche thus refers to RaphaeFs Transfiguration, he illuminates the play of illusion or appearance on the seifsame basis of "die schreckliche Weisheit des Silen" and reveaJing their "gegenseitige Notwendigkeit" (GT 4, KSA l, p. 39). But this is the same appearance that he will describe äs hopelessly one-dimensional, aperspectival, so that in the aesthetic play of Ulusion "justifying" life and reality, we ourselves, caught in the play of life, have the same flattened consciousness "als es die auf Leinwand gemalten Krieger von der auf ihr dargestellten Schlacht haben" (GTS, KSA l, p. 47).
Where music is the Dionysian complement to the Apollonian vision of the drama, the consummate or complete work of tragic art requkes the three-dimensional contours of sculpture or architecture, or even the four dimensions of theatre and dance. Thus the vision at the end of Die Geburt der Tragödie projects the transfigured music of philosophy äs an attempt to think "eine Menschwerdung der Dissonanz," rather than the metaphorical phantasm of musical sweetness, äs the very nature of human existence. In ordef to survive such "dissonance," in order to live, we need both Dionysus and Apollo. The image that Nietzsche gives for this vision is a thoroughly bodily one of space and sphere: it is the working of sculpture and architecture on one's being, the musical reflection of life in the Greece Nietzsche now "invents" for us:
im Wandeln unter hohen ionischen Säulengängen, aufwärtsblickend zu einem Horizont, der durch reine und edle Linien abgeschnitten ist, neben sich Wiederspiegelungen seiner verklärten Gestalt in leuchtendem Marmor, rings um sich feierlich schreitende oder zart bewegte Menschen, mit harmonisch tönenden Lauten und rhythmischer Gebärdensprache (GT 25).
Although both deities, äs interdependent, exact an equal daim on us, we can continue the contrast here äs one between sculpture (not äs Apollo's art but äs architecture, äs music in space) and painting (not äs Dionysian color, but äs an Apollinian vision). Hence, for a painterly example taken nearly at random, it might be claimed, given that Nietzsche knew nothing of Turner, that Nietzsche might not have been able to see the spin of nature through the artistVTurner's eyes, reflecting the industrial reconstitution of the colors and textures of the world Heidegger later condemned äs the cybernetic world of modern technology, in Turner's paintings of the effluent transmutation of the frames of light and air traced upon the Western sky, now a Century old and almost cloyingly romanticized äs fatuously diaphanous visions of still English, still pre-industrial romance. But, to risk a parallel contrast, I submit, 1 ^Nietzsche might have been able to see the work of time in space in Boccioni, in Brancusi, in Giacometti, not because these are somehow better or more modern artists but because these names name sculptors not only of objects (like Rodin) but space.
Plastic art, the art of sculpture, yokes space and time because (and from an exactly antique or Greek perspective) sculpture's resistance to the distance of contemplation distinguishes it from the prototypical art of painting, the same resistance allying i t to architecture and music. One may not simply gaze upon, contemplate, or merely see a sculpture. Instead, seeing oneself in seeing (being seen äs much äs seeing), the statue's plasticity claims one, installing the visitor äs a guest on its own terms, in response to it, within in its own space and hence caught into, captured by its own orbit This is the reason the Laokoon, seen in person, face on -äs it was first seen: indeed and out of doors -could exercise such a galvanic effect." It exerted a literally dimensional claim on those who encountered it, or described it for others in these ecstatic terms. This is the reason Hölderlin could have reacted (äs apocrypha suggests he did) to a primal encounter with the sight of classical (however derivative, decadent, we would say: inauthentic) statues passing through the gardens of a private villa in France. The statue, especially under heaven, like Rilke's broken and demanding torso, utters an irrestible imperative, urging the change that an entire society was not then and still cannot master. One is äs much seen by äs one sees. One is claimed, transported by the statue itself, into the dimensional round of the sculpture's tension, Thus the contemporary viewer can also be poised, if only, for our technologized sensibilities, in a dim recollection of the way in which the Hellene would have had no choice but to be set against, arched in Opposition to the measure of the statue (c£ KSA l, p. 581 and KSA 11, 25[101] ). Thus Nietzsche's early remarks refer not only to the "Statue als Verzauberung einer Seele in Stein" (KSA 8, 22[36] ) but to "Verbergen der Tragödie (wie die Statuenwelt)" (KSA 7, 7[15] ; cf. KSA 9, 7[101J), and he quotes Hölderlin not with all his rigor-but to mark the damnation of the effort to capture the same esteem and the same response or sensibility in our flattened, tearing and not ripening, time. And in his early notes, Nietzsche cites Hölderlin himself, äs crying: ""auch ich, mit allem guten Willen, tappe mit meinem Thun und Denken diesen einzigen Menschen (den Griechen) in der Welt nur nach und bin in dem, wa$ ich treibe und sage, oft nur um so ungeschickter und ungereimter, weil ich wie die Gänse mit platten Rissen im modernen Wasser stehe und immächtig zum griechischen Himmel cmporflügle." " (KSA 7, 29(107))
Transpguration and the Tragic Limit of Critiqw
For Nietzsche, the history of modern culture since the Greeks (the only reference point he ever considers in the context of culture) has demonstrated that "Es hat sich unmöglich erwiesen, eine Kultur auf das Wissen zu bauen" (KSA 7, 19 [l 05] ) because die exclusive ideal of truth (and that divine exclusivity is the earmark of truth) kills: 'Wahrheit tödtet -ja tödtet sich selbst (insofern sie erkennt, daß ihr Fundament der Irrthum ist)." (29[7] ) For äs Nietzsche describes it, the human longing for consummate'txuthfulness must be admired äs a[n] "herrliche heroische Lust des Menschen, in einer lügenhaften Natur! Aber nur sehr relativ möglich! Das ist tragisch. Das ist das tragische Problem Kants!" (19[104J; cf. [154] ).
100 Nietzsche articulates this heroic longing not only äs a conflict between art and science but also in terms of the love philosophers, so-called lovers of wisdom, seem so much to lack (29 [224] ) exactly in their most acquisitive Impulses.
101 This "andre Wahrheitsgefähl stammt aus der Liebe, Beweis der Kraft. Das Aussprechen der beseligenden Wahrheit aus Liebe: bezieht sich auf Erkenntnisse des Einzelnen, die er nicht mittheilen muß, aber deren überquellende Beseligung ihn zwingt." (19 [103] ) Thus Nietzsche challenges the philosopher to aspire to the ideal of the lover, not the rigorous image of a scientist, in Kant's good sense, but instead, and exactly, the ideal of an artist of life. 100 Cf. GT 15. Such a longing for truth is grounded in an unknowing faith in knowledge, or Illusion: "Die Logik, als Alleinherrscherin, führt zur Lüge: denn sie ist nicht die Alleinherrscherin." (Nachlaß 1872-73, KSA 7, 19[103] ). Now, the early Nietzsche argues, äs arter an immense detour through the rationalist fantasy of Socratico-Aristotelian clarity, which is also to say Christianity, "So kommen wir, auf ungeheurem Umweg, wieder auf das natürliche Verhalten (bei den Griechen) zurück. 
